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ABSTRACT 
In this paper we present a social welfare model for the evaluation 
of the Spanish income tax system in 1986 and 1988. The redistributive 
effect, capturing the improvement in vertical inequality, and the revenue 
effect, capturing the los s in mean disposable income as a consequence of 
the tax, are combined to produce a measure of social welfare change. Then, 
following Lambert and Ramos (1996) the redistributive effect is 
decomposed into a horizontal and a vertical contribution. The main 
novelties we introduce are the following three. (a) We adopt an absolute 
framework which is seldom used in the empirical literature. (b) We 
emphasize the differences between the horizontal inequality due to the 
exemptions and tax credits not based on equity considerations, and what 
we caH ultilttellded horizontal inequality arising from: i) the practice of 
applying a progressive tax schedule to unadjusted incomes folIowed by 
family tax credits, rather than applying directly the tax schedule to income 
adjusted by family circumstances; ii) differences between the analyst's 
equivalence scale and the implicit fiscal scale, and iii) the existence of 
other characteristics, ignored by the analyst but taken as ethicalIy relevant 
by the fiscal authority. Among other things, this breakdown aHows us a 
more detailed explanation than previous studies of the increase in the 
horizontal inequality in Spain between 1986 and 1988. (c) FinalIy, we 
highlight a fundamental difficulty in all methods, including ours, that rely 
on the partition by similars for the measurement of horizontal inequality. 
1 

1. Consider the demographic characteristics usually taken into account 
in the definition of adjusted income. Designers of personal income systems 
do realize that it would be horizontally inequitable if, in spite of differences in 
size and composition, two tax units with the same income were to be charged 
the same tax. To avoid these inequities, the IRPF grants tax credits as a 
function of these characteristics, implicitly defining what we may call a fiscal 
equivalence scale. In many cases, including the Spanish one, the fiscal 
authority appears to follow an absolute notion of inequality in the treatment 
of family characteristics: aH tax units with identical number and types of 
dependents are granted the same tax credit independently of their income. 
However, aH empirical studies we know of adopt a concept of relative 
inequality. In the relative framework, when tax units of the same 
characteristics are given the same tax credit, there is an improvement in 
relative inequality. On our part, we thought interesting to experiment with 
an absolute framework in which such family tax credits do not cause a change 
in absolute inequality. 
Absolute notions of inequality and welfare constitute one of the polar 
cases discussed in the theoretical literature(4), but are seldom used in the 
empirical work. A convenient consequence of adopting an absolute 
framework, is that the expression for the social welfare change (SWC for 
short) induced by the tax system, becomes equal to the RE plus the REVE. On 
the other hand, when we add the additive separability property to the usual 
ones, Blackorby et al (1981) establish that in the absolute case we end up 
necessarily with the family of Kolm-Pollak welfare and inequality measures. 
This settles the question of the choice of measurement instruments. 
As income distribution analysts, we assume that the only ethically 
relevant characteristic is tax unit size. In the relative case, Coulter et al (1992a, 
1992b) have insisted in the separate study of each ethicaHy homogeneous 
subgroup. Then, to pool together all subgroups in order to study the 
population as a whole, they suggest to parametrize the value judgements 
implicit in the definition of adjusted income. We apply this methodology, 
making sure that the income adjustment procedure does not change the 
absolute inequality of the subgroups within the basic partition by tax unit 
size(S). 
2. The IRPF can be described in terms of the foHowing four main 
elements: (i) the notion of pre-tax income; the taxable income, which is equal 
to pre-tax income less allowable exemptions; (iii) the tax schedule, which taxes 
differently regular as oposed to irregular or occasional income; and (iv) a 
number of tax credits to be deducted from the gross tax to reach the final tax. 
After-tax income is equal to pre-tax income less the final tax. 
However, in this paper we view the IRPF as the combination of a tax 
schedule on unadjusted pre-tax income, and a set of adjustments introduced 
by the fiscal authority for very different reasons, sorne having to do with the 
avoidance of horizontal inequities and sorne not. An advantage of this point 
of view, is that the HI usuaHy measured in the literature can be seen to consist 
of two parts: the HI due to the exemptions and tax credits not based on equity 
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INTRODUcnON 
One of the features of general Franco's regime, which lasted from 
1939 to 1975, was the abscence of a modern income tax system of the type we 
have come to expect in a democratic state. However, shortly after it was 
elected in 1978, the first Spanish democratic parliament adopted a progressive 
income tax, the Impuesto sobre la Renta de las Personas Físicas (IRPF for 
short), which will be analyzed in the seque!. 
Since its inception, the IRPF has been subject to important changes. 
Here we concentrate in a comparison between the 1986 and 1988 versions. 
Between these two years, two major changes took place. On the one hand, a 
mínimum exempted income was introduced in 1988, together with 
important changes in average and marginal tax rates. On the other hand, the 
1986 IRPF was a family tax, combined with a fixed tax credit for every earner 
and a variable deduction determíned as a functíon of the incomes of the first 
two wage earners. In 1988, as a consequence of a sentence passed by the 
Supreme Court (Tribunal Constitucional), income splitting was introduced, 
while the variable deduction was reformed in order to provide an incentive 
for tax units to fill in joint returns. 
Since behavioral responses are beyond the scope of this paper, we 
shall concern ourselves excIusively with the evaluation of the IRPF in the 
light of the cIassical principIes of horizontal and vertical equity which 
demand, respectively, equal treatment of equals and different treatment of 
unequals. In a heterogeneous world in which tax units differ not only in 
income but in non-income characteristics, these principIes are applied in 
equivalent or adjusted income space. 
We use a traditional social welfare framework, where social or 
aggregate welfare is summarized by two statistics of the income distribution: 
the mean, and an index of relative or absolute vertical inequality. Thus, on 
the one hand, the greater the reduction of inequality, usually known as the 
redistributive effect (RE for short), the better. But on the other hand, since tax 
payments are extracted from individuals, their after tax welfare is certainly 
reduced(1). This revenue effect (REVE for short) manifests itself at the social 
level as a reduction in mean disposable income. 
In a second step, following Lambert and Ramos (1996) the RE is 
decomposed ¡nto components measuring horizontal and vertical inequities 
(HI and VI, respectively, for short). This decomposition requires additively 
separable measurement instruments. Ideally, the additive separability 
property should be applied to the partition by exact equals in adjusted income 
space. However, one of the well known difficulties in the measurement of 
horizontal inequality is that in the real world one seldom encounters two tax 
units with the same income(2). As a way out, we follow again Lambert and 
Ramos in widening the notion of "exact equals" to "close similars" (or 
simply, similars) in the empírical part(3). 
The main novelties we introduce are the following three. 
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considerations, and what we may call unintended HI arising from: (i) the 
practice of applying a progressive tax schedule to unadjusted incomes 
followed by family tax credits, rather than applying directly the tax schedule to 
income adjusted by family circumstances; (H) differences between the analyst's 
equivalence scale and the implicit fiscal scale, both based only on 
demographic characteristics, and (iii) the existence of other characteristics, 
ignored by the analyst but taken as ethically relevant by the fiscal authority. 
Examples of the latter studied in this paper, are the differential tax treatment 
of irregular income, the second earner 's income, and wage earnings as 
opposed to other income sources. 
3. We highlight a fundamental difficulty in all methods, including 
ours, that rely on the partition by similars for the measurement of HI. 
Consider the ideal partition of exact equals in adjusted income space. The pre­
tax inequality within each subgroup in this partition is zero. Therefore, the 
application of a progressive tax schedule to unadjusted incomes gives rise to 
HI which contributes llegatively to the RE. However, in the real world the 
pre-tax inequality within each subgroup ín the partition of similars is, 
hopefully small, but greater than zero. As we will see below, in the case in 
which a small or no adjustment is made for tax unít size, the application of 
the tax schedule may very well lead to a measure of HI which contributes 
positively to the RE. These complications can only be studied if one isolates 
the impact of the tax schedule from the other elements of the system and, 
simultaneously, one considers different values for the parameter which 
defines the generosity of the equivalence scale. This double condition is not 
fulfilled by any of the previous studies we know of. 
The Instituto de Estlldios Fiscales in Spain has be en collecting a panel 
of about 200,000 income tax returns for the period 1982 to 1990. This has made 
possible a number of microeconomÍC studies(6) on the distributional impact 
of the Spanish IRPF. Previous work on the IRPF has led to the following 
stylized facts: 
i) From 1982 to 1990, the RE has been consistently increasing. The 
explanation is to be found in an increase of the mean of the pre-tax 
distribution in money and real terms, an increase over time in the inequality 
of that distribution, and to a smaller extent, in the changes introduced in the 
tax system during this period(7). 
ii) However measured, the HI has been of a small order of magnitude. 
As far as the trend is concerned, it has been declining over time, except for an 
unexpected increase in 1988, the year in which income splitting was first 
introduced(8). 
In this paper we work with a random sample of more than 10,000 tax 
returns for 1986 and 1988, representative of the Illstituto's panel. We study 
two types of empírical questions. On the one hand, we confirm previous 
findings for the RE and the HI of the system as a whole. In our framework, it 
is inmediate to obtain also estimates for the overall SWC. To provide a 
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measure of the IRPF's progressivity in these years, we compare its RE with 
that of a proportional tax system which yields the same tax revenue. 
On the other hand, we concentrate on the structure of the IRPF at two 
levels of desaggregation. FirstIy, we break down the system into two blocks= 
the application of the tax schedule on pre-.tax income (after the correction for 
the favorable treatment of irregular income), and the rest of the exemptions 
and tax credits taken as a whole. The main finding is that the second block 
contributes negatively to the RE but positively to the Swc. 
Secondly, we estimate the fundamental concepts in this paper -the RE, 
the REVE, the SWC, as well as the decomposition of the RE into HI and VI 
components- for each of six different stages. The first two are the application 
of the tax schedule to pre-tax unadjusted income, and the correction 
introduced by family tax credits. The next three deal with the'fiscal authority's 
attempts to avoid horizontal inequities arising from tax unit characteristics 
absent in the definition of adjusted income. These are the treatment of 
irregular income, the second earner's income, and wage earnings. Stage six 
includes all other exemptions and tax credits justified by other than equity 
reasons. Among other things, this breakdown allows us a more detailed 
explanation tban previous studies of the increase in the HI between 1986 and 
1988. 
The rest of the paper is organized in five sections and an Appendix. 
Section 1 lies down the welfare comparisons between tax units of different 
size, the social evaluation procedure, and the distinction between horizontal 
and vertical inequities. Section II contains a description of the IRPF and an 
exposition of which concepts might be signed a priori at each of the six 
separate stages. Section III is devoted to the empirical results. Section IV 
focusses on unintended HI. Section V presents a summary of results and 
sorne conc1uding remarks. The Appendix describes in detail how the data was 
organized into the six stages. 
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l. THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK(9) 
1.1. Welfare comparisons between heterogeneous tax units 
Assume we have a heterogeneous population of i = 1,...,N tax units, 
whích may differ in their pre-tax income Xl and/or a number of non-income 
characteristics. In addition to a person known as the taxpayer, tax units may 
include a spouse and/or a number of dependents. In this paper the only 
ethically relevant characteristic is tax unit size, denoted by si. Original 
incomes xi and xj are non comparable unless si =sj. Otherwise, one can define 
adjusted or equivalent income ín the absolute case as 
where the parameter A can be interpreted as the cost of a person, so that A(SC 
1) is the income we can subtract from a tax unit of size si for a reference 
taxpayer to enjoy the same utility level with the remaining income. The 
parameter A indícates the importance we are willing to give to the economies 
of scale in consumption within the tax unit: the greater is A, the smaller are 
the economies of scale, and the closer adjusted income becomes to income per 
capita. 
Let XK denote the vector of incomes for units of size K = l,...,K, and let 
A(.) be any index of absolute inequality. Then for any K, 
that is, the adjusted income inequality within each ethically homogeneous 
subgroup of identical tax units, is equal to the original income inequality. In 
other words, the adjustment procedure does not alter the inequality within 
homogeneous subgroups. 
People Uve grouped in families and / or households, but we only have 
information on incomes and characteristics at the tax unit level. Since a 
family or a household may consist of more than one tax unit, economíes of 
scale at the family or household level are probably larger than at the tax unit 
leveL This makes harder any attempt to establish individual welfare 
comparisons. Therefore, we take as our object of study the unweighted 
distribution of tax uni! adjusted income. 
1.2. Social welfare functions 
A social welfare functíon is a real valued function <P defined in the 
space RN of adjusted incomes, with the interpretation that for each income 
distribution, say r = (rl,...,rn), <P(r) provides the aggregate welfare from a 
S 
normative point of view. For any Íflcome distribution r and any social welfare 
function <1>, 1ets(r) be the equally-distributed-equivalent income (EDE!) 
defined by 
tl>(r) <I>(s(r),...,s(r». 
For any partition of the population, we are interested in welfare measures 
capable of distinguishing -in a convenient additive way- between two 
components: welfare within the subgroups, weighted by demographic shares, 
and the 10ss of welfare due to the inequality between the subgroups. Without 
10ss of generality, let us choose the partition by tax unit size into K = l, ...,K 
subgroups. Blackorby et al (1981) define between-group inequality as the 
inequality that would result if each household received her subgroup's EDEI, 
s(rK ). These authors establish that, combined with the usual assumptions on 
social welfare functions(10), the separability conditíons required to estímate 
the EDEI of any subgroup in any partition independently of the rest of the 
distribution lead in the absolute case to the Kolm-Pollak family: 
where y is interpreted as an aversion to inequality parameter: as y increases, 
the social indifference curves show increasing curvature until only the 
income of the poorest person matters. 
Let Ay(.) is the index of absolute inequality consistent with <Dy defined 
by 
It can be shown that 
where J.l(.) is the mean of the distribution. On the other hand, since 
where 
NK* 1 M K KS =(S ,.··,s ), S :::: (s(r ).1 ), K = l,...,M, 
we have that 
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This is an appealing decomposition, in which social welfare is seen to be equal 
to the weighted average of the aggregate welfare within each of the subgroups, 
with weights equal to population shares, less the inequality between the 
subgroups. 
Recall that, in our definition of adjusted income, we have 
parametrized the weight we give to the economies of scale in consumption 
achieved by tax units: ri(A) = rÍ - A{si - 1). Social welfare of the adjusted income 
distribution r(A) is equal to 
where S = k¡ SI is the total number of persons in the population and, for each 
K, 
1.3. The social welfare change (SWC) 
Let x = (xl, ..., xN ) be the pre-tax income distribution, T (Tl, ... , TN ) the 
tax vector, and v (v1, ... , vN ) the after-tax income distribution, where vi = xi ­
Ti, i = 1,... , N. Given parameter values for y and A, social welfare before taxes is 
<llyCx(A», while welfare after taxes is <llyCv(A». Therefore, the SWC induced by 
the tax system is: 
Since 
we have that 
SWC(A, y) = RE(A, y) + REVE, 
where 
RE(A, y) =Ay(x(A» - Ay(v(A» 
is the redistributive effect of the IRPF, dependent on both A and y, and 
REVE = !l(v(A» - !l(x(A» = - ~l(T) 
is the revenue effect which is independent of both parameters. 
1. 4. Horizontal and vertical inequities 
As far as the measurement of HI is concerned, we do not introduce 
explicit value judgements on its deleterious effects(1I). Following Lambert 
7 
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and Ramos (1996), we express the RE as the sum of two terms capturing the 
horizontal inequities and a pure vertical effect. For this purpose, consider the 
partition by similars in the distribution of pre-tax adjusted income, X(A), with 
N e tax units in each subgroup, e = 1,... ,E. We apply the additive separability 
property to RE(12) as follows: 
RE(A, y) =Ay(X(A» - Ay(V(A» 
* * 
= keINeIN] [Ay(xe(A» - Ay(Ve(A»] + [A/Sxe(A» - Ay(sve<A»], 
where 
and similarly for the post-tax distribution VeA). Therefore, 
RE(A, y) HI(A, y) + VI(A, y) 
where the expression 
measures the HI for the population as a whole, while the expression 
is the pure vertical effect induced by the IRPF. As Lambert and Ramos (1996) 
point out, it is as if horizontally, the tax acts to increase the inequality where 
there was Httle beíore -within each group oí pre-tax similars in adjusted 
income space- and vertically, it acts to reduce inequality between such groups. 
Because HI(A, y) = RE(A, y) - VI(A, y), an expression which is expected to be 
negative, Lambert and Ramos indicate that horizontal inequality gets 
measured as a 10ss oí vertical performance. 
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11. A DESCRIPTION OF THE IRPF 
n. 1. Basic features 
The key elements of the system which need to be described are the 
following four: (i) the notion of pre-tax income (rendimiento neto); the 
taxable income (base imponible), which is equal to pre-tax income less 
allowable exemptions; (iii) the tax schedule, which taxes differentIy regular as 
oposed to irregular or occasional income; and (iv) a number of tax credits to 
be deducted from the gross tax (cuota íntegra) to reach the final tax (cuota 
líquida). After-tax income is equal to pre-tax income less the final tax. 
(i) Pre-tax income consists of regular plus irregular income. Regular 
income is equal to wage or salary income, less mandatory contributions to the 
public Social Security system, plus income -net of necessary expenditures­
from entrepeneurial, professional or agrarian activities, capital income, and 
imputed income from owner-occupied housing(13). Irregular income consists 
of irregular or occasional earnings, realized capital gains, income from 
inheritances or donations, less compensation from patrimonial losses in 
previous years. 
(ii) Taxable income is equal to pre-tax income less unemployment 
compensation and a proportional deduction from wage income. 
Unemployment compensation is exempted by virtue of a Supreme Court 
sentence. The deduction from wage income is granted in compensation for 
the fact that wage earners have much smaller opportunities for tax evasion 
than receipients of non-wage earnings. In 1988 contributions to private 
pension funds are also exempted. 
(iii) In both years, the tax schedule for regular income is progressive in 
the sense that average and absolute tax rates are increasing functions of 
income. Marginal tax rates are less than one, so that there can be no 
rerankings from the application of the schedule. In 1986 there is no 
minimum exempted income, and tax rates start at an 8 per cent up to an 
income equal to 500,000 pesetas. In 1988, incomes below 600,000 pesetas are tax 
exempted, and average and marginal rates change considerably relative to 
1986. In both years, irregular income is splitted into two parts: an annualized 
component, and the rest of irregular income. The first component is taxed as 
regular income, while the second is taxed at a smaller rateo The gross tax 
results from the application of the tax schedule to regular and irregular 
taxable income. 
(iv) The final tax is equal to the gross tax less a number of tax credits. 
We distinguish between two classes. The first class consists of tax credits 
granted by the fiscal authority to avoid horizontal inequities in three different 
situations. The first two situations are common to both years: a tax credit for 
dependents(14), equal to a fixed deduction for each dependent of a given type, 
and an additional compensation to wage earners, this time in the form of a 
9 
fixed tax credit. The third a:nd more complex case, differs considerably 
between the two years. 
The 1986 IRPF is a family tax: all tax units have to fill a joint return, 
and pre-tax income is equal to income from aH sources accruing to aH family 
members. In exchange for this, the foHowing tax credits are allowed: a fixed 
allowance for every taxpayer, a second allowance if a spouse is present, a third 
allowance depending on the number of earners, and a variable deduction 
depending on the income of the first two earners. The varaible deduction 
recognizes that an income vector (90, 10) should not be taxed as an income 
vector (50, 50), nor as an income of 100 units accruing a tax unít consisting of a 
single taxpayer. In a family tax, recipients of the three vectors would be 
assigned the same gross tax, say GT(100), while in an individual tax the gross 
tax will be ordered as follows: GT(100) > GT(90) > GT(50) > GT(lO), with 
GT(100) > GT(90) + GT(10) > 2GT(50). Because the fiscal authority does not 
want to discriminate against married individuals, a tax credit is granted to the 
first two tax units, with tIle first one receiving a greater tax break than the 
second. 
In 1988, the main difference is the introduction of income splitting. 
Tax units with a spouse but a single earner are allowed a fixed deduction as 
before. Tax units with two earners are allowed to fill in either a joint return, 
or two separate returns. In the first case, they are given a tax credit equal to the 
maximum of the fixed deduction or a variable deduction depending again on 
the vector of incomes. Those choosing separa te returns, have their incomes 
taxed separately with no deductions whatsoever. However, to ensure 
comparability between the two tax regimes, in the empirical analysis 
separated tax retums are combined to produce a single observation for each 
family. 
Tax credits in the second dass are those justified on grounds unrelated 
to horizontal equity considerations. This dass includes tax breaks linked to 
current expenditures on health, the acquisition of the primary and secondary 
residential housing, and other types of saving through the acquisition of life 
insurance or other financial assets either privately or publicly issued, and a 
large number of minor items which is not necessary to list here (15). 
n. 2. The six stages of the analysis 
For the purpose of this paper, the above elements are reorganized in 
six consecutive stages. (See the Appendix for details on the use of the data for 
this purpose). We begin with the application of the tax schedule to total pre­
tax family income, treated entirely as regular income. Then, we consider the 
correction for the demographic characteristics taken into account in the 
definition of adjusted income: the presence of dependents of various types 
andj or a spouse, whether an income earner or not. The following three stages 
are reserved for the favorable treatment of tax unit characteristics absent in 
the analyst's equivalence scale. These are, respectively, the presence of 
irregular income, the second earner's income and wage earnings. Finally" the 
sixth stage iso lates the impact of the remaining tax credits(16). 
10 
To simplify the notation, let us omitt the parameters y and A 
capturing, respectively, the aversion to absolute inequality and the generosity 
of the equivalence scale as a function of tax unit size. Then, for each stage j = 
1,... , 6, let us denote by REy REVEy SWCy HIy and VIj the central concepts of 
this study: the redistributive effect, the revenue effect and the social welfare 
change, where 
and the horizontal and the vertical contribution to the redistributive effect: 
The question is: what can be said a priori about the sign and relative 
magnitude of these concepts at each stage and for the IRPF as a whole? 
Stage 1. The tax schedule 
Let zli(A) denote the adjusted income of tax unit i after the gross tax 
on pre-tax family income, GT(xi): 
where Xi(A) = xi - A{si -1). Then stage 1 takes us from X(A) = (Xl (A),... , XN(A)) to 
Zl(A) = (zll(A), ... , zlN(A)). The expression for social change is: 
where 
REl (A) = A(X(A)) - A(Zl(A)) 
and 
REVEl = !!(zl(A)) - ~l(X(A)) = - ~l(GT(x)). 
On the other hand, by applying the additive separability property of the Kolm­
Pollak index of absolute inequality to the partition of similars e = 1,... , E, we 
have that 
where 
and 
* * VIl(A) = [AY<~xe(A)) - Ay(~zle(A))]. 
11 
I I 
Notice that if we could work with exact equals, then A(xeo..» = ofor all 
e, so that HIl(A) < O for aH values of A with HIl(O) =O. Tbis is the HI due to the 
fact that the tax schedule applies to unadjusted income, but the evaluation 
procedure considers the partition by exact equals in adjusted in come space. 
However, the most we can hope for is to construct a partition of similars in 
X(A) space. Whatever the means used to acomplish this task, to which we will 
return in the empirical part, we have that A(Xe(A» > O for all e. Therefore, our 
estimate of HI provides un upper bound for the HI in the partition by exact 
equals. In particular, think of the polar case in which A = O. Then, because of 
the progressivity of the tariff, we have that A(xe(O» > A(Zle(O» for all e, and 
therefore HIl(O) > O. Of course, tbis quantity does not reflect a type of HI we 
want to do away with. It simply captures the effect of a progressive tariff 
within similars in unadjusted income space. However, for A sufficiently 
large, it may very well be the case that A(Xe(A» < A(Zle(A» for sorne e, so that 
HIl(A) becomes negative. 
On the other hand, the expression VIl(A) measures the pure vertical 
effect induced by the tax schedule. Because of lhe progressivity of thE~ tax 
schedule, we expect VIl (A) > Oand large(l7) for all A, and hence, REl(A) > O . 
However, REVEl should be large also, but of the opposite sign, so that 
nothing can be said a priori about -lhe sign of SWCl . 
Stage 2. Demographic deductions 
Tax units with more members will typicaHy have larger pre-tax family 
income, but also greater needs. Thus, exactly for the same reasons that the 
income distribution analyst considers tax unit size in the definition of 
adjusted income, the tax authority compensates tax units for the costs 
incurred by a spouse andj or dependents of different types. The term HI2(A) 
measures the HI created by family deductions aimed to compensate for the 
fact that the tax schedule applies lo unadjusted income. Thus, for large 
enough A, we expect HI2(A) > O. However, the term VI2(A) cannot be signed a 
priori. Correspondingly, RE2(A) is also unsigned. Therefore, in spite of the fact 
that REVE2 is positive, SW<; cannot be signed either. 
Stage 3. The correction for irregular incomes 
As we have seen, the fiscal authority applies a lower tax rate to sorne 
part of irregular income in order to avoid horizontal inequities between tax 
units with the same pre-tax income but a different composition in terms of 
regular and irregular components. However, since irregular incomes are 
received mostly by the rich, we expect the VI3(A) component to be negative for 
aH A. On the other hand, in sorne subgroup of similars sorne units may have 
irregular incomes and sorne not. Thus, the favorable treatment of irregular 
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income will lead to an ¡ncrease in absolute inequality within thesubgroups 
ion question, and hence to a negative HI3(A) component. Therefore, the 
corresponding RE3(A) is expected to be negative. Of course, as in every stage 
except the first one, REVE3 is positive; therefore SWC3(A) is unsigned a priori. 
Stages 4 and 5. The treatment of the second earner's income and of wage 
income 
Notice that nothing can be said a priori about the sign of REj(A) or 
V~(A) for any j = 4, 5. This simply reflects the fact that whether these types of 
dedudions generates a progressive or a regressíve ímpact is an empírical 
question. Nothing can be said either about the sign of HIj(A) in either case. As 
a matter of fact, the sign and magnitude of HI4 after the introduction of 
in come splitting in 1988, is one of the issues that has attraded more attention 
in recent research about the IRPF. 
Stage 6. Deductions not justified on equity grounds 
In the sixth place, we have the tax credits granted by the fiscal 
authority for other than equity reasons. However legitima te their respective 
justification from other points of view, all deductions in this class typically 
cause sorne a priori social concern because it is feared that they give rise to 
ethically unjustifiable HI6(A) O and possibIy negative. On the other hand,;o! 
neither VI6(A) nor RE6(A) can be signed a priori, although it is expected that 
this type of tax breaks is ultimateIy regressive, Le. RE6(A) < o. However, 
whether this may lead to a SWC6(A) < Ocannot be said a priori. 
The IRPF as a whole 
Because of the relative importance of the progressive tax schedule, 
we expect both VI(A) and RE(A) > O for all A. However, based on all previous 
investigations(18), we expect HI(A) < Obut smaIl. 
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111. EMPIRlCAL RESULTS 
111.1. The data 
Our data comes from a representative random sample of the panel of 
income tax returns collected by the Instituto de Estudios Fiscales. Por 
comparability purposes, separate returns in 1988 have been aggregated ¡nto a 
single tax unít. The distribution of tax units with positive pre-tax income(19) 
for 1986 and 1988 is in Table 1. Tax uníts have been classified by the type of 
return. We distinguish between individual returns, separate returns and, 
within joint returns, those who benefit only from fixed family tax credits, and 
those who benefit from the variable deduction depending on the incomes of 
the first two earners. 
TABLE 1. Distribution of tax units in the sample 
Tax unit type 1986 % 1988 % 
Individual returns 3,046 27.7 3,757 31.2 
Joint retums 
Fixed family tax credits only 6,481 59.0 6,237 51.8 
Variable deduction 1,466 13.3 1,263 10.5 
Separate returns 773 6.4 
Total 10,993 100.0 12,030 100.0 
In 1988 the number of new entrants in the panel is greater than the 
number of exits. In relative terms there are more individual and less joint 
returns. However, the demographic structure does not change mucho As can 
be observed in Table 2, the proportion of small units tends to increase, while 
the proportion of tax units with 5 or more people tends to decrease. 
Consequently, from 1986 to 1988 mean tax unit size decreases from 3.02 to 
2.89.0n the other hand, the distribution by size within each type, remains 
rather stable during the periodo Three quarters of tax units with a single 
taxpayer consists of a single individual, and the rest have at most 1 or 2 
dependents. Among tax units with at least two people and/or two earners, 
those receiving the fixed tax credits have a slightly greater average size and a 
larger share of dependents in 1986. In 1988, those filling separate returns are 
indistinguishable with those filling a joint return with fixed family tax 
credits. 
TABLE 2. Distribution of tax units by type and tax unít size 
Tax unít size, 1986 
Tax unit type 1 2 3 4 5 60r+ Total Mean 
Individual returns 76.0 17.1 5.1 1.1 0.5 0.2 100.0 1.33 
Joint retums 
Fixed farnily tax credits 21.2 24.4 31.8 13.8 8.8 100.0 3.70 
Variable dedudion 20.6 30.7 32.0 10.1 6.6 100.0 3.55 
Total 21.1 20.0 19.9 23.3 9.6 6.1 100.0 3.02 
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Tax unit size, 1988 
Tax unit type 1 2 3 4 5 6or+ Total Mean 
Individual returns 75.1 18.0 5.0 1.4 0.4 0.1 100.0 1.35 
Joint retums 
Fixed family tax credits 22.7 24.3 32.5 12.9 7.6 100.0 3.62 
Variable deduction 21.2 30.0 34.7 9.8 4.3 100.0 3.48 
Separate returns 24.3 28.7 24.8 12.8 9.4 100.0 3.61 
Total 23.4 21.2 19.2 22.5 8.6 5.1 100.0 2.89 
._.------------------------_...------------------------------------------------------------------------
The evolution of pre-tax incomes is shown in Table 3 for several 
values of the parameter A.. When we do not take into account tax unit size, 
that is, when A. = O, average money income increases by 24.5 percent from 1986 
lo 1988. Since the rate of inflation was 10 percent, there is a considerable 
growth in real lerms of 14.5 percent. However, tax revenues increased even 
more(20). Thus, as we can see in Table 3, fiscal presure defined as 
F(A.) = Üt(T)/ ~t(x(A.»100 
increases from 11.9 per cent in 1986 to 13.2 in 1988, when A = O. Of course, the 
greater is A, the greater is fiscal presure in every year. 
T ABLE 3. The evolution of pre-tax ineomes and fiscal presure 
1986 1988 
A= O 30,000 90,000 120,000 O 40,000 120,000 200,000 
~t(X(A.» 1,431,745 1,371,051 1,249,665 1,188,972 1,782,861 1,707,074 1,555,500 1,403,925 
F(A) 11.9 12.5 13.7 14.4 13.2 13.8 15.2 16.8 
The dislribution of taxable income by income sources is presented in 
Table 4. Wage earnings represent dose to 80 percent in both periods, although 
lhe share of most other sources increases slightly in 1988. In particular, the 
share of irregular income is considerably larger in 1988. 
TABLE 4.T axable ineome by ineome sourees 
Ineomesourees 1986 1988 
Wage earnings 79.7 77.3 
Entrepeneurial 8.4 9.3 
Proffesional 2.6 2.6 
Agrarían 1.8 1.8 
Capital income 5.0 5.8 
Imputed net housing rent 1.6 1.0 
Irregular income 0.9 2.2 
Total 100.0 100.0 
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I1I.2. The influence of the parameters representing the generosity of 
the equivalence scale (A) and the aversion to inequality (y) 
We begin by choosing y = 2.2E-6, and A = 90,000/120,000 for 
1986/1988, respectively. Absolute inequality is not scale independent, but 
these two A values represent, approximately, 15 per cent of mean per capita 
pre-tax income in both years. Table 5 presents estimates of the mean, as well 
as the absolute inequality and welfare of pre-tax and after-tax adjusted income 
distributions. These allow us to compute the first three fundamental concepts 
of this paper: the RE, the REVE, and the SWC in each year. The 
decomposition of RE into HI and VI components is treat~d in a separate 
section. 
T ABLE 5. TIte impact of the IRPF in the central case: 
y = 22E-6 and 1. =90,000/120,000 in 1986/1988 
1986 1988 
Pre-tax distribution x 
Mean: f.l(x) t249,665 1,555,500 
Inequality: A(x) 538,141 791,519 
Welfare: <I>(x) = f.l(x) - A(x) 711,524 763,981 
Post-tax distribution v 
Mean: f.l(v) 1,061,886 1,319,125 
Inequality: A(v) 384,332 578,748 
Welfare: <I>(v) =:' f.l(v) - A(v) 677,554 740,376 
Changes induced by the IRPF: 
RE A(x) - A(v) 153,809 212,771 
REVE = f.l(v) - f.l(x) = - f.lCn -187,779 - 236,375 
SWC= <I>(v) - <I>(x) = RE +REVE - 33,970 - 23,604 
Changes in relative terms: 
(RE!A(x»100 28.6 26.9 
(SWC!<I>(x»100 -4.8 - 3.1 
As expected, the RE is positive in both years. Relative to the absolute 
inequality of pre-tax income, it represents an improvement of 28.6 and 26.9 
per cent in inequality in 1986 and 1988, respectively. However, the REVE is 
larger, so that there SWC < O in both years. This social welfare loss, prior to 
any benefit derived from the public expenditure and transfers made possible 
by the tax revenue, is of a small order of magnitud e: between 3 and 5 per cent 
as a percentage of pre-tax welfare. 
Table 6 presents the impact on RE and SWC of changes in y and A. 
Two comments are in order. In the first place, given y, the absolute inequality 
of adjusted income, Ay(X(A», first decreases and then increases as a function of 
A. Beyond a certain point, absolute inequality becomes larger than mean 
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income and social welfare becomes negative, a situation which presents 
problems of interpretation. This leads us to fix the upper bound of A at 
120,000/200,000 pesetas in 1986/1988, respectively. However, since the 
inequality of pre-tax and after-tax income follow the same non-linear pattern 
with A, the RE varíes little with A. Since the REVE is independent of A, the 
same is the case for the SWC(A) = RE(A) + REVE. 
TABLE6. TheimpactonSWCandREofchanging y and 'A. 
1986 'A.: o 30,000 90,000 120,000 
Y =2.2E-7 39.9 40.3 40.6 40.5 
RE/A(x) y = 2.2E-6 28.1 28.5 28.6 28.1 
in% y = 1E-5 18.7 18,8 16.9 
Y =2.2E-7 -10.5 -11.0 -12.2 -12.9 
SWC/W(x) y = 2.2E-6 ~3.9 -4,2 -4.8 -5.2 
in% y = 1E-5 -0.2 -0.1 0.0 
1988 'A.: o 40,000 120,000 200,000 
Y =2.2E-7 39.5 39.9 40.2 39.9 
RE/A(x) y = 22E-6 26.5 26,9 26.9 25.4 
in% y = 1E-5 17.6 17.7 15.3 
Y =2.2E-7 -9.6 -10.1 -11.2 -12,7 
SWC/W(x) y = 2.2E-6 -2.5 -2,7 -3.1 -3.9 
in% y = 1E-S 0.0 0.0 0.0 
In the second place, given A, the greater the aversion to inequality 
parameter y, the greater is the improvement in inequality captured by the REy 
and the smaller the social welfare 1055. As a matter of fact, when y = 1E-5, 
there is no social welfare 1055 for most values of A. We must take into account 
that the greater the y, the greater is the inequality of pre-tax income and the 
smaller is social welfare(21). Thus, the ratios (REy/ Ay(x» and (SWCy/CPy(x» 
both decrease as when y increses. 
Given these results, we feel justified in concentrating our aUention to 
he central case in which y = 2.2E-6, and A= 90,000/120,000 for 1986/1988. 
111.3. The tax schedule versus exemptions and tax credits 
We begin with an overall view of the tax in both years. We reorganize 
the six stages into two main blocks: the operation of the tax schedule, 
including the treatment of irregular income, and the rest of exemptions and 
tax credits taken as a whole. We use two complementary decompositions. In 
the first one, we consider three steps: (i) the effect of a proportional tax 
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schedule which achieves the same revenue as the actual one, (ii) the 
departure from proportionality effect, embedded in the progressive tax 
schedule, and (iii) the combined effect of exemptions and tax credits. In the 
second decomposition, we simply consider two steps: (iv) the effect of a 
proportional tax which achieves the actual total revenue, that is to say, the 
gross revenue less exemptions and tax credits, and (v) the departure from 
proportionality effect of the system as a whole. 
Notice that, in the absolute case, steps (i) and (iv) should give rise to a 
positive RE, i.e. to an improvement in inequality. We expect (ií) to lead to a 
positive RE too, but nothing can be said a priori about the sign of step (iii) or, 
indeed, of step (v). The information is in Table 9. 
TABLE 9. An overall view of the redistributive and welfare effeds of the IRPF 
RE duelo: 1986 1988 
1. A proportional tax shedule 156,187 213,587 
2. The tax schedule's departure from proportionality 44,777 77,460 
3. Exemptions and tax credits - 47,155 - 78,276 
Total RE=1+2+3 153,809 212,771 
REVEduelo: 
4. A proportional tax schedule - 294,425 - 353,493 
5. Exemptions and tax credits 106,646 117,118 
Total REVE=4+5 -187,779 - 236,375 
SWCdueto: 
6. A proporti~nal tax schedule = 1 + 4 -138,238 -139,906 
7. The tax schedule's departure from proportionality =2 44,777 77,460 
8. Exemptions and tax credits =3 + 5 59,491 38,842 
Total SWC=6 + 7 +8 -33,970 - 23,604 
RE dueto: 
9. A proportíonal tax system 92,664 145,140 
10. The system's departure from proportionality 61,145 67,631 
Total RE = 9 + 10 153,809 212,771 
11. REVE =4+5 -187,779 - 236,375 
SWCdueto: 
12. A proportional tax system = 9 + 11 - 95,115 - 91,235 
13. The system's departure from proportionality = 10 61,145 67,631 
Total SWC = 12+ 13 -33,970 - 23,604 
In both years, the tax schedule's departure from proportionality 
contributes positively to the RE: 22.3 and 26.6 per cent in 1986 and 1988, 
respectively, of the RE attributable to the tax schedule. However, in both years 
the exemptions and tax credits have a regressive effect on the RE(22). 
Curiously enough, these two effeds are of the same order of magnitude in 
both years. On the other hand, the exemptions and tax credits represent a 36.2 
per cent of the gross tax revenue colleded in 1986, versus a 33.2 per cent in 
1988. 
The RE of the tax schedule is smaller than its REVE, so that the SWC 
attributable to the tariff is negative. This welfare 1055 is 13.1 per cent and 8.2 
18 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
per cent of pre-tax welfare in 1986 and 1988, respectively. On the contrary, the 
increase in disposable income due to the exemptions and tax credits is greater 
than its negative contribution to the RE, so that they contribute positively to 
the overall SWc. As we know, the net SWC is negative, but of a small order 
of magnitude: 4.8 and 3.1 per cent in 1986 and 1988, respectively. 
If we now look at the system as a whole, we observe that the 
departure from proportionality represents a 39.7 per cent of the overall RE in 
1986, and a 31.8 in 1988. Relative to the pre-tax welfare, a proportional tax 
system generates a 13.4 welfare 1055 in 1986 and a 11.9 welfare 1055 in 1988. 
This is partially offset by the departure from proportionality effect, which 
amounts to a welfare gain of 8.6 per cent in 1986 and 8.8 in 1988. 
It would be tempting to use this analysis to draw definite conclusions 
about whether the legislative changes introduced in 1988 have caused the tax 
schedule, the exemptions and tax credits, or the IRPF as a whole to be more or 
less progressive than in 1986. However, in order to do that we would have to 
take into account the impact of the exits and entries into the sample, as well 
as the role of the initial pre-tax distribution, distinguishing between the 
change in the unit of account and the change in real terms in both the mean 
and absolute inequality -a task left for further research(23). 
111. 4. The different stages of the IRPF 
Now is time to loo k at the different stages in sorne detail. In Table 10 
we present the information for each of the six stages on the breakdown of the 
RE into a HI and a VI component, the REVE, and the SWc. There are two 
rows for each stage: the first is for the absolute amounts in pesetas; the second, 
in parenthesis, is for the expressions (HII RE)100 and (VII RE)100. 
TABLE 10. The stages of the IRPF 1986 
Stages ID VI RE REVE SWC 
1. Tax schedule -551 202,543 201,992 -296.064 - 94,071 
(-0.3) (100.3) (100.0) 
2. Fami1y tax credits 1,232 - 6,639 -5,407 31,995 26,588 
(-22.8) (122.8) (100.0) 
J. Irregular income -598 -430 -1,028 1,638 610 
(58.2) (41.8) (100.0) 
4. Secnd. earner's income -619 - 6,528 -7,147 9,204 2,057 
(8.7) (91.3) (100.0) 
5. Wage earnings -284 - 9,758 -10,043 23,313 13,271 
(2.8) (97.2) (100.0) 
6. Non-equity exemptions - 2,087 - 22,471 - 24,557 42,133 17,575 
and tax credits (8.5) (91.5) (100.0) 
AH - 2,907 156,717 153,809 -187,779 - 33,970 
(- 1.9) (101.9) (100.0) 
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1988 

Stages ID VI RE REVE SWC 
1. Tax schedule -1,505 298,373 296,868 - 359,249 -62,381 
(-0.5) (100.5) (100.0) 
2. Farnily tax credits 1,957 -15,434 -13,477 35,082 21,605 
(-14.5) (114.5) (100.0) 
3. Irregular income - 2,438 -3,383 -5,821 6,056 235 
(41.9) (58.1) (100.0) 
4. Scnd. earner's income -3,421 -25,705 - 29,126 31,791 2,664 
(11.7) (88.3) (100.0) 
S. Wage earnings -632 -15,997 -16,629 27,041 10,412 
(3.8) (96.2) (100.0) 
6. Non-equity exemptions - 2,322 -16,721 -19,043 22,903 3,860 
and tax credits (12.2) (87.8) (100.0) 
AH - 8,361 221,132 212,771 - 236,375 - 23,604 
(. 3.9) (103.9) (100.0) 
It should be noted that, after sorne experimentation, the criterion to 
form the similars partition in adjusted income space has be en the following. 
For each subgroup of similars e = l, ...,E, we have fixed the absolute inequality 
A(Xe(A» less than or equal than 0.5 per cent of the inequality for the 
population as a whole, A(X(A». In this way, for example, for A 90,000/120,000 
in 1986/1988, the number of subgroups turned out to be E = 86/130 in a 
sample of 10,993/12,030 tax units. 
It would be best to treat one year at a time, starting with 1986. Each 
row in Table 10 allows us to understand the sign of the RE attributable to each 
stage. (i) Notíce that the application of the tax schedule leads to a small 
negative HI1, onIy 2.7 per cent of the corresponding RE1, which is of course 
positive. The explanation for Hl1 < O is twofold: on the one hand, the tax 
schedule applies to unadjusted income but we evaluate the effect on adjusted 
income space for a sufficient large A = 90,000 pesetas. On the other hand, thís 
value of A need not coincide with the implicit fiscal scale. Oí) Family 
deductions are meant to correct the Hl1 created in step 1. This is exactly what 
we observe: HI2 is now positive. However, a large enough VI2 < O leads to a 
RE2 < O. (iii) When we correct for the treatment of irregular income, we find 
an important HI3 effect, greater than 50 per cent of the corresponding RE3' 
Notice that VI3 < O, indicating a not surprising pro-rich bias in this stage. 
Hence, RE3 < O. (iv) The help granted by the IRPF to two-earners tax units 
creates a small HI4 < O effect, 8.7 per cent of the corresponding RE4' The fact 
that VI4 < O, shows that these tax credits tend to favor the rich more than the 
poor. (v) Tax breaks to wage earners have two components in 1986: one is 
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fixed, the other is proportional to wage income. The second component leads 
necessarily to an increase in absolute inequality. We actually observe a small 
HIs < Oeffect and a VIs < O, so that REs < O. (vi) Fina11y, deductions not 
justified on equity grounds give rise to negative HI6 and VI6 effects, as 
expected. 
The sum of a11 effects attributable to the various exemptions and tax 
credits, generate a negative HI as well as a negative VI, and hence a negative 
contribution to RE, as we saw before. This is exactly the same conclusion 
obtained by Camarero et al (1993) in their study of a11 the tax returns for the 
province of Vizcaya in 1989. Their grouping of deductions is somewhat 
different than ours, and they measure HI by applying a scale invariant 
measure of distributional change to the partition by similars in income 
adjusted space. These authors study the impact on HI of. eliminating the 
different tax breaks, mantaining in each case the tax revenue constant. They 
find that only the elimination of family tax credits will increase HI. The 
elimination of a11 other tax breaks, including the important case of tax credits 
for two-earners tax units, will reduce the HI -the pattern described above(24). 
The small negative HI¡ effect altributable to the tariff, is completely 
offset by the positive VIl' which leads to aREl> O. On balance, there is an 
overall HI < O, but of a small order of magnitude: 1.9 per cent of the overall 
RE. The pattern by stages in 1988 is very similar. The main difference is that 
the overall HI represents now 3.9 per cent of the RE. For our two years, 
Lambert and Ramos (1996) results in the relative case are as follows: they 
estimate a negative HI contribution in both years, equal to 1.9 per cent of the 
RE in 1986 and to 2.5 per cent in 1988. 
These global results are in line with previous studies: 
(i) In Spain, like in other countries, HI is a small quantitative 
phenomenon however it is measured. 
(ií) As in Lambert and Ramos (1996) in the relative case, in the 
absolute case HI detracts from the improvement in vertical inequality which 
we expect from an income tax system. Therefore HI, however small, is still 
worrisome if we take into account who is favored from it. 
OH) Like Pazos et al (1994), and Lambert and Ramos (1996), we find 
that HI increases in 1988. Our detailed approach allows us to search for the 
cause of this increase. The relevant information is in column (1) of Table 11, 
which presents the percentage contribution of each stage to the overall HI. 
Pazos et al (1994) attribute the change to the greater role of irregular 
incomes in 1988. We confirm the increased importance of this stage, which 
gains 10 percentage points in our explanation of the overall HI. But there are 
other factors. In the first place, the increase in HI is achieved in spite of a 
lessening of the importance of tax breaks not justified on equity grounds. In 
the second place, we observe that fixed family tax credits have a smaller 
correcting role in 1988 than in 1986. In the third place, the treatment of two­
earner tax units is contributing very dearly to the increase in HI experienced 
in 1988. 
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To conclude our analysis of the structure of theIRPF by stages, we 
turn to the VI, the RE, the REVE, and the SWC. Columns (2) to (5) in Table 11 
provide the percentage contribution of each stage to the corresponding totals. 
Starting with 1986, we observe that due to the small role of HI the percentage 
distribution of VI is essentially the same as the one for the RE. In agreement 
with a priori expectations, non-equity tax breaks have the greatest negative 
contribution to RE, followed by the favorable treatment of wage earners. As 
far as the REVE is concerned, non-equity tax breaks have also the greatest 
effect, followed by family tax credits and the policy measures related to wage 
earners. The net effect is that family tax credits and non-equity tax breaks, 
followed by the treatment of wage earners, have the greatest possitive 
contributions to SWC. In 1988, the main difference is the increasing 
regressive role played by family tax credits and, aboye aH, by the tratment of 
the second earner's income. On the contrary, the importance of non-equity 
tax breaks is reduced. 
TABLE 11. The stages of the IRPF. Percentage distributions 
1986 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Stages In VI RE REVE SWC 
1. Tax schedule 18.9 129.2 131.3 157.7 276.9 
2. Family tax credits -42.4 -4.2 -3.5 -17.0 -78.3 
3. Irre,gularincome 20.6 -0.3 -0.7 -0.9 -1.8 
4. Second earner's income 21.3 -4.1 -4.6 -4.9 -6.0 
5. Wage earnings 9.8 -6.2 -6.5 -12.5 -39.1 
6. Non-equity exemptions 71.8 -14.4 -16.0 -22.4 -51.7 
and tax credits 
AH 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
1988 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Stages In VI RE REVE SWC 
1. Tax schedule 18.0 134.9 139.5 152.0 264.3 
2. Family tax credits -23.4 -7.0 -6.3 -14.8 -91.5 
3. Irre,gular income 29.2 -1.5 -2.7 -2.6 -1.0 
4. Second earner's income 40.9 -11.6 -13.7 -13.4 -11.3 
5. Wage earnings 7.5 -7.2 -7.8 -11.5 -44.1 
6. Non-equity exemptions 27.8 -7.6 - 8.9 - 9.7 -16.4 
and tax credits 
AH 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
-------_._-------------_._._--------------------------------------------------------------------------­
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IV. UNINTENDED INEQUALITY 
As we said in the Introduction, there are several types of unintended 
HI. In the first place, there is the HI created beca use the tax schedule applies to 
unadjusted income while the evaluation is performed in terms of adjusted 
income. When the parameter A determining the extent of the economies of 
scale in consumption is sufficiently large, our discussion in Section III.2 leads 
us to expect that the HI will be negatíve. Thís is índeed the case in the central 
case in which A=90,000/120,000 in 1986/1988, respectívely. 
However, one may ask: what is the discrepancy between such values 
and the equivalence scale implicitly defined by the fiscal rules? The fiscal scale 
depends on family composition, as well as on tax unít size. However, on 
average, the fiscal scale is 17,427/22,308 pesetas in 1986/1988, respectively, a 
value well below our central A'S. We have evaluated the IRPF using precisely 
the fiscal equivalence scale for each tax unít. The results are in Table 12, 
which contains also the estima tes for the central case, as well as for the polar 
cases A = O and A = 120,000/200,000 in 1986 and 1988, respectively. 
TABLE 12. Horizontal inequality as a fundion of 1. 
1986 
Stages 1.: O fiscal scale 90,000 120,000 
1. T ax sched ule 2,337 -91.1 1,724 -63.7 -551 18.9 -923 33.8 
2. Family tax credits -657 25.6 -324 12.0 1,232 -42.4 1,653 -60.6 
3. Irregular income -670 26.1 -657 24.3 -598 20.6 -659 24.2 
4. Scnd. earner's inc. -824 32.1 -761 28.1 -619 21.3 -518 19.0 
5. Wage earnings -300 11.7 -269 9.9 -284 9.8 -206 7.5 
6. Non-equity ¡tems -2,452 95.6 -2,420 89.5 -2,087 71.8 -2,073 76.0 
ID -2,566 100.0 -2,704 100.0 -2,908 100.0 -2,727 100.0 
HI/RE in % 1.68 1.77 1.89 1.77 
1988 
Stages 1.: O fiscal scale 120,000 200,000 
1. Tax schedule 2,248 -26.0 1,038 -11:6 -1,505 18.0 -4,676 54.0 
2. Family tax credits -921 10.6 -346 3.9 1,957 -23.4 3,038 -35.1 
3. Irregular income -2,269 26.2 -2,276 25.5 -2,438 29.2 -2,362 27.3 
4. Scnd. earner's inc. -4,800 55.5 -4,742 53.1 -3,421 40.9 -2,533 29.3 
5. Wage income -822 9.5 -717 8.0 -632 7.5 -295 3.4 
6. Non-equity items -2,089 24.1 -1,888 21.1 -2,322 27.8 -1,825 21.1 
ID -8,653 100.0 -8,931 100.0 -8,361 100.0 -8,653 100.0 
HI/RE in % 4.09 4.25 3.93 4.04 
We observe that for both A = O and the fiscal scale, the HI attributable 
to the tax schedule becomes posítive, as we indicated in Section 111.2 it would 
be the case for sufficiently low values of A. Notice that the HI attributable to 
family deductions changes signs also. In all cases, the net impact of the 
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schedule corrected by farnilytax credits contributes positively to the RE. This 
reflects the fact that, because we work with sirnilars rather than exact equals, 
part of the impact of a progressive tariff is transmitted to the HI component of 
RE, rather than only to the VI component as it would have been desirable. 
In the second place, the HI attributable to the correction for irregular 
income is obviously unintended by the fiscal authority. It seems reasonable 
that transitory components of income are taxed at a lower rateo Notice, 
however, that it is mainly the rich who benefit from this treatment. 
In the third place, there is no reason in income distribution theory for 
treating wage earnings any different than other income sources. However, the 
fiscal authority has reasons to grant wage earnings a favorable treatment. 
Essentially, at least in a country like Spain, because it is much harder to evade 
wages than other income sources. 
Finally, let us consider the treatment of the second earner's income. 
Again, in income distribution theory one simply adds up income from all 
sources and aH family members to arrive at the family total. However, the 
fiscal authority takes into account that, because the tariff is progressive, the 
gross tax of the sum is greater than the sum of the gross taxes of the parts. In 
both 1986 and 1988 in Spain, a variable deduction is granted to tax units with 
two earners. In addition, in 1988 the possibility of income splitting is 
introduced. 
Apparently, the fiscal authority reformed the variable deduction in 
1988 with the aim of partially offseting the consequences of income splitting 
which it was feared it would help mostly the rich. As we have seen in Table 
12, tax credits in this stage are clearIy regressive in both years, but much more 
so in 1988. 
One could ask: does splitting as such contribute negatively to HI, VI 
and, therefore, to the RE? We have attempted to answer this question by 
estimating these effects in a situation in which the tax units which had 
decided to fiU in separate returns were forced to make a joint return, 
benefiting of course from the corresponding variable deduction. The results 
are in Table 13. 
T ABLE 13. The effects of income splitting and the variable deduction on ID, VI, and RE 
Effects attributable to: 
Variable deduction Variable dedo Splitting 
and splitting oruy oruy 
1. HI4 -3,422 -2,519 -903 
2. VI4 -25,705 -21,819 -3,886 
RE4=HI4+V4 -29,127 -24,338 -4,789 
The conclusion is that both splitting and the variable deduction 
contribute to a negative HI4' a negative VI4' and hence to a negative RE4. 
However, the issue is not completely settled. After aH, the intention with 
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income splitting was to improve HI among individual eal'ners, not among 
tax units as defined in this and previous studies(25), where separate returns 
are added up in order to make possible the comparison with a past without 
splitting. 
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v. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper we have presented a social welfare model for the 
evaluation of the Spanish income tax system, the IRPF, in 1986 and 1988. In 
these two years, the tax schedule was subject to important changes. In 
addition, in 1988 income splitting was introduced. 
The redistributive effect (RE), capturing the improvement in 
inequality, and the revenue effect (REVE), capturing the loss in mean 
disposable income as a consequence of the tax, are combined to produce a 
measure of social welfare change (SWC). Then, following Lambert and 
Ramos (1996) the RE is decomposed into a horizontal and a vertical 
contribution (HI and VI, respectively). 
The IRPF implicitly adopts an absolute equivalence scale, depending 
on the demographic characteristics usually employed in income distribution 
analysis to adjust income for non-income needs. In order to evaluate the tax 
system from a comparable standpoint, we adopt also an absolute framework 
which is seldom used in the empiricalliterature. In the absolute case, the class 
of social welfare functions which satisfies a number of desirable properties 
-including the additive separability condition necessary to implement the 
Lambert and Ramos approach to the measurement of HI- collapses to the 
Kolm-Pollak family of social welfare functions whose members are identified 
by an aversion to inequality parameter. Moreover, the SWC is seen to be 
equal to the RE plus the REVE, a convenient simplification. 
The main global findings of the paper are the following. 
1. Let us separate the IRPF into two blocks, one consisting of the tax 
schedule on pre-tax income (after correcting for the treatment of irregular 
income), and another consisting of the rest of exemptions and all the tax 
credits. We find that in both years the second block contributes negatively to 
the RE. However, this is offset by the impact of the progresive tax schedule. 
Therefore, as documented in previous studies in a relative framework, we 
confirm that in both years there is a sizable RE > Ofor the IRPF as a whole. 
2. We consider a proportional tax system yielding the same tax 
revenue that the IRPF in the two years under study. This leaves the RE in the 
relative case unchanged, but generates a positive RE in the absolute case. The 
increase in the RE over and aboye this effect, provides a measure of the 
degree of progressivity of the system. We estimate that the departure from 
proportionality accounts, approximately, for 40/30 per cent of the total RE in 
1986/1988, respectively. 
3. The exemptions and tax credits represent about a third of the gross 
tax revenue collected in both years. This increase in disposable income is 
greater than its negative contribution to the RE, so that this block of measures 
generates a welfare gain. On the contrary, the negative REVE of the tax 
schedule offsets its positive RE, generating a welfare loss. We find that, prior 
to the public expenditure and transfers made possible by the REVE, the system 
as a whole gives rise to a welfare loss of about 5/3 per cent of pre-tax welfare 
in 1986/1988, respectively. 
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4. As in previous studies in Spain and other countries in a relative 
framework, we find that the HI of the IRPF is qUi\ntitatively small, of about 
2/4 per cent of the RE in each year. However, we confirm that the horizontal 
inequities favor the rich more than the poor. 
Perhaps the more interesting results are obtained when we break 
down the IRPF into separate stages. This lead us to the following conclusions: 
5. In 1986, the more important component of the HI is attributable to 
the exemptions and tax credits unjustifiable on equity grounds. This is no 
longer the case in 1988, a year in which the overall HI is twice as large. The 
new treatment of the second earner's income after the change in the law, 
appears now as the more important cause of the HI. 
6. If the tax schedule is applied to pre-tax unadjusted income and the 
evaluation exercise proceeds in terms of adjusted income, then there must 
appear HI whenever the economies of scale in eonsumption are assumed 
small enough. Such (unintended) HI is meant to be corrected by family tax 
credits which recognize that larger tax units have greater needs. When the 
cost of a tax unit reference member is assumed to be equal to 90,000/120,000 
pesetas, or about 15 per cent of mean per capita income in each year, this is 
exactly what we observe. 
7. The cost of a reference member implicit in the fiscal equivalence 
seale is mueh smaller than the aboye figures, about 17,500/22,000 pesetas on 
average in 1986/1988, respectively. When we evaluate the system assuming 
the fiscal equivalence scale, the tax schedule creates a pos; tive HI and the 
family tax credits crea te a Ilegative HI. This is seen to be the consequence of a 
fundamental shortcoming of all procedures relying on the notion of similars 
rather that exact equals in adjusted income space. A progressive tax schedule 
reduces the absolute inequality both between subgroups of similars, captured 
by a positive VI, and within each subgroup of similars, giving rise also to a 
positive HI. When economies of scale are assumed to be very important (or 
the cost of a reference member is assumed to be very small), this effect 
weights more than the effect refered to in point 6 aboye. 
8. The fiscal authority grants exemptions and tax credits to avoid 
certain horizontal inequities which are not recognized in the equivalence 
scale used to define adjusted income. Therefore, these poliey measures lead to 
(unintended) HI. In this paper we have analized the following three cases: the 
favorable treatment of irregular income, the second earner's income, and 
wage earnings as opposed to other income sources. AH of them generate 
negative HI and VI contributions, and hence a negative RE. 
It should be emphasized that the global results on the RE, its 
breakdown into HI and VI contributions, and the SWC of the IRPF are liUle 
affected by different assumptions about the generosity of the equivalence 
scale. On the other hand, the greater the aversion to absolute inequality, the 
greater is the improvement in inequality captured by the RE, and the smaller 
the social welfare loss. 
The aboye results are as good as the random samples of 10,993/12,030 
tax units in 1986/1988 provided by the Instituto de Estudios Fiscales for this 
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study. These are representetative samples of the Instituo's panel, consisting of 
approximately 200,000 tax returns. Perhaps the worse shortcoming of this 
paper is the lack of statistical properties of our estimates. Future research 
should also take into account the following points: 
i) To establish intertemporal comparisons between 1986 and 1988, 
appropiate care must be taken of the differences in the unit of account in an 
absolute framework in which measurement instruments are not scale 
independent. This is in addition to the differences between the pre-tax 
income distributions expressed in real terms, and the role of exits and entries 
into the panel between these two years. 
iD Previous studies have found that, in the relative case, the increase 
in HI in 1988 is a once and for all phenomenon. This should be investigated 
in an absolute framework. Furthermore, to determine the role of income 
splitting as a cause of HI before and after 1988, one should take into account 
that the Supreme Court ordered a change of the system in order to avoid 
horizontal inequities among individual income earners. This suggests a study 
of the distribution of individual tax returns, rather than the distribution in 
which couples filling in separate returns after 1988 are treated as a single tax 
unit. 
. iii) There are a number of normative exercises worth pursuing. The 
first is the study of a tax system which aplies the IRPF tax schedule to income 
adjusted by family circumstances, rather than to unadjusted income plus a set 
of family tax credits. The second exercise, is the study of simpler tax systems 
which trade off flatter tax rates for fewer exemptions and tax credits. 
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APPENDIX 
Let us denote pre-tax famíly íncome for tax unit i by xi. It consists of regular plus 
irregular income. Regular income is equal to wage or salary income, Wi, plus income from other 
regular sources, Oí I less expenditures necessary for the obtention of such income, EXpÍ. If we 
denote irregular income by IRRi, then we have 
Taxable income, /, is equal to pre-tax income less a proportional deduction from wage 
income,pW i , where p= 0.02 during the two years under study. In addition, in 1988 contributions 
to prívate pension funds, PENi, are also exempted. Therefore, we have: 
Let us denote by P(.) the tax schedule on reglllar income. In both years, whenever 
irregular income is positive IRRi is splitted in two parts: an annualized component, ANNUALi , 
and the rest of irregular income, RESTi. The first component is taxed as regular income, while 
the second component is taxed at a smaller rate P*(.). Therefore, the gross tax on regular and 
irregular taxable income, GT, is defined by: 
The final tax, Ti, is equal to the gros s tax less a number of tax credits which differ 
considerably during the two periods. In 1986, we distinguish between four tax credits. In the first 
place, there is a tax credit for dependents, DEpi, equal to a fixed dedudion ah for each 
dependent of type h. Thus, if di, is the number of dependents of type h in tax unit i, we have 
In the second place, the following tax credíts are allowed: a fixed allowance for every 
taxpayer, GEN, a fixed allowance if a spouse is present, COUPLE; a second allowance 
depending on the number of earners, NEARNi, and a variable deduction, V(x~, x~), depending 00 
the vector of incomes of the first two wage earners, x~ and x~. In the third place, there is a fixed 
tax credit for wage earners, WTC. Finally, let OTd denote all other tax credits not justífied on 
equity grounds. Therefore, in 1986 the final tax is defined by: 
Ti =GT(yi) - DEpi - (GEN +COUPLE + NEARNi + V(x~, x~» - WTC -OTd. 
In 1988, the main difference lS that income splitting is introduced, and the allowances 
GEN and NEARNÍ are eliminated. Tax units with a spouse but a single earner are allowed a 
fixed deduction COUPLE as before, so that 
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Ti = GT(yi) - DEpi - COUPLE - WTC -OTd. 
Tax units with two earners are allowed to fill in either a joint return, or two separate returns. In 
the first case, they are given a tax credit equal to the maximum of COUPLE or a variable 
dedudion V(Xi, X~) depending again on the vector of incomes (Xi, X~). Therefore, we ha ve 
Those choosing separate returns, had their incomes taxed separately but loose their right to 
i iCOUPLE or V(x1, x2). Therefore, we have 
. i i ' . 
TI = GT(Y1) +G(Y2) - DEpl - WTC - OTCI. 
Of course, both in 1986 and 1988, after-tax income, vi, is equal to pre-tax income less 
lhe final tax: 
III. 2. The six stages of the analysis 
In this paper, we view the IRPF as consisting of six stages. Let us denote by zli (A) the 
adjusted income after the tax schedule P(.) has been applied on pre-tax family income. That is, 
zli(A) =xi(A) _P(xi ). 
The first stage takes us from x (A): (X\A), ... , xN(A» to zl (A)= (zll(A), ... , zlN (A». 
Por tax units receiving irregular income, P(xi ) would overestimate the tax due. 
Unfortunately, \Ve have detailed information on the irregular income sources which may give 
rise to ANNUALi > O, but \Ve can only estímate if RESTi is different from Odue to other sources. 
Therefore, we cannot compute P*(RESTi). Our solution is to approximate the excess tax by p(yi) 
- GT(yi). If z2i denotes the income after the differential treatment of irregular income, then we 
have 
z2i(A) = zli (A) + [P(xi) _ p(yi) _ GT(yi)]. 
The second stage takes us from zl (A)tO z2 (A)= (z21(A),... , z2N(A) )(26). 
In the third place, the tax authority compensates tax units for the costs incurred by a 
spouse and/or dependents of different types. If \Ve let z3i be the income after the family tax 
credits, that is, 
z3i (A) = z2i(A) +COUPLE +DEMi, 
then the third stage takes us from Z2(A) tOZ3(A) = (z31(A), ... , z3N(A». 
In the fourth place, the IRPF treats differently the income earned by the fírst or the 
second earner in the tax unit. If we let SCD be the compensation to tax unit i on these grounds, 
then we have, in 1986: 
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i i i i.SCO =NEARN + V(xl' x2), 
in 1988, joint returns: 
. i i 
SCol = [Max(COUPLE,V(xl' x2» - COUPLE], 
and in 1988, separa te returns: 
Let z4i be the income after this stage, that ¡s, 
In this notation, the fourth stage takes us from z3 (A)to z4 (1..)= (z4\1..), ... , z4N (A». 
In the fifth place, let zSi be the income after correcting the tax bill for the favorable 
treatment of wage income; that is, 
z5i(A) =z3i (A)+ [p(yi + pW i) _p(yi)] + TCW. 
the fifth stage takes us from z4 (A)to z5 (1..)= (zSl(A), ... , z5N (A». 
FinalIy, there are all other tax credits, OTd, granted by the fiscal authority for 
other than equity reasons. Then we have that after-tax adjusted income vi(A) should be equal 
to: 
ví(A) = zSi(A) + [P(/ + pW i + PENi) _ p(yi + pW i)] + [GT(yi) - COUPLE - OEMi -
SCOi - WTC - Ti] 
The sixth stage takes us from z5 (A)to v (1..)= (v1(A),... , vN(A». Taking into account that P(xi ) = 
p(yi _ pW i _PENi ), it ís easy to see check that J(A) = xi(A)_ Ti. 
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NOTES 

(1) Of course, this is before taking into account the impact on people's 
welfare of publie expenditures and transfers made possible by the income tax 
revenues, an aspect which is beyond this paper's scope. 
(2) This difficulty leads many authors to identify the maintenance of 
horizontal equity with the preservation of the ranking in the pre-tax 
distribution. See, for instance, Feldstein (1976), Atkinson (1980), Plotnick 
(1982, 1985), and King (1983). 
(3) For other authors using the notion of similars see, for instance, 
Berliant and Strauss (1985), Camarero et al (1993), Aronson et al (1994), and 
Pazos et al (1994). 
(4) See Kolm (1976a, 1976b) and Blackorby and Donaldson (1980). 
(5) For other applications of this methodology, see Ruiz-Castillo 
(1995a, 1996) and, in an income tax context, Aronson et al (1994). 
(6) See Castañer (1991a, 1991b), Jimenez and Salas (1991), Salas and 
Pérez-Villacastín (1992), Lasheras et al (1994), Pazos et al (1994), Vargas (1995), 
and Lambert and Ramos (1996). 
(7) See Castañer (1991a), Jimenez and Salas (1991), Salas and Pérez­
Villacastín (1992), and Lasheras et al (1994). 
(8) See Camarero et al (1993), Pazos et al (1994), and Lambert and 
Ramos (1996). 
(9) For a detailed treatment of these issues, induding the extension lo 
the relative case, see Ruiz-Castillo (1995b). 
(10) Namely, continuity, S-concavity, monotonicity along rays paralell 
to the line of equality, and population replication invariance. 
(11) For this approach see, for instance, Plotnick (1981) and King (1983). 
Jenkins (1994) contains a useful review and extensions of previous results. 
(12) In this we differ from those who use the índices of distributional 
change studied by Cowell (1980, 1985). Jenkins (1988) applies them lo the 
unadjusted income in the ethically relevant partition, while Camarero et al 
(1993) and Pazos et al (1994) apply them to the partition by similars in 
unadjusted and adjusted income. 
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(13) Tbis last income source is measured as 3 or 2 per cent, in 1986 and '" ! 
1988, respectively, of the value of the housing stock, less mortgage interest. 
(14) Dependents are children under 18 years old, minors between 18 
and 15 years old with earnings below a certain amount, handicapped children 
without income, and parents with incomes below a certain limil. Since 1988, a 
fixed allowance for people over 70 years old is also granted. 
(15) Whether sorne of these deductions can be given also a horizontal 
equity justification is, of course, a matter of opinion. However, we do not 
have microeconomic information to treat any of them outside of tbis residual 
group. 
(16) We include in this stage the general tax credit to every taxpayer, 
granted only in 1986. Of course, tbis lea ves the RE6 unchanged and affects the 
SWC6 only throughits positive impact on the REVE6. 
(17) Of course, tbis is only guaranteed in a homogeneous world if and 
only if total tax liability is increasing with income. For the absolute case, see 
Moyes (1988). 
(18) See Camarero at al (1993), Pazos et al (1995), and Lambert and 
Ramos (1996). 
(19) The number of tax units with negative incomes, left out of the 
analysis, are 26 and 39 in 1986 and 1988, respectively. 
(20) It should be noticed that 147 tax units in 1986 and 1,590 in 1988 
had both CI and CL equal to O. In 1988, this is mostly due to the fact that those 
tax units have pre-tax income below the legal minimum, which is 600,000 
pesetas. The main reason for the rest and the 1986 cases, is that they receive 
irregular income. 
(21) Pre-tax welfare becomes negative for y = lE-5 and large values of A, 
which is the reason why no estima tes are recorded in Table 6 for these cases. 
(22) For the relative case, Salas and Pérez-Villacastín (1992) report a 
worsening of the progressive contribution of deductions during this periodo 
Given that deductions raise tax units' income, even a moderate 
improvement in relative inequality can be compatible with a worsening of 
absolute inequality. 
(23) For previous results on these matters, see Argimón and 
González-Páramo (1987), }imenez and Salas (1991), and Lasheras et al (1994). 
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(24) Pazos et al (1994) report the opposite resulto They study two stages: 
the effect of the tax schedule on taxable income (Le., pre-tax income less all 
allowable exemptions), and tye effect of all tax credits as a whole. They find 
that the tax schedule on taxable income creates HI, but that the tax credits 
reduces it. 
(25) See Castañer (1991b), Pazos et al (1994), and Lambert and Ramos 
(1996). 
(26) The number of tax units for which we have direct information on 
irregular income, is 166 and 308 in 1986 and 1988, respectively. In addition, we 
estimate that another 159 and 67 units in each year should be classified in this 
group. The criteria is that the difference p(yi) - GT(yi) is greater than a lower 
bound equal to 3,000 pesetas. Thus, 138 and 375 in aH, representing 3.0 and 3.1 
per cent of the sample in 1986 and 1988, respectively, qualify for the treatment 
of irregular income described aboye. 
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